

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Bulletin

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
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OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF THE
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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International Trade and Development—The Year Ahead

by Deputy Under Secretary Dillon¹

History has repeatedly demonstrated that, when the American people are faced with a serious problem which is unmistakably clear to them, they somehow discover the unity, the resources, and the determination to solve it. I do not doubt, therefore, that our missile-satellite program will succeed.

The larger question is whether we will respond, adequately and in time, to the overall challenge to our society which is implicit in the progress of Communist technology and power now being so dramatically advertised to an apprehensive world.

Much of that challenge is outside the realm of military power. It lies in the field of international economic relations. For, unless the free nations, acting together, succeed in building strong and healthy economies which answer to the aspirations of their people, we may be sure that we will not stay the course of Soviet world domination no matter what our military power may be.

That is the reason why President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, in their Declaration of Common Purpose issued in Washington last month,² have stated that "We recognize that our collective security efforts must be supported and reinforced by cooperative economic action."

Next year, when Congress convenes, the people of the United States will again have the opportunity to consider what "cooperative economic action"—to use the words of the Presi-

dent and Prime Minister—they will in fact authorize the Government of the United States to support. The Congress will decide this issue in the light of the debates which will then take place. Today I should like to mention some of the key problems in foreign economic policy as we see them from within the executive branch of the Government and to suggest the kind of cooperative economic action which will be necessary if these problems are to be effectively attacked.

World Economic Situation

To begin with, let us look at the world economic situation as it appears today.

In Western Europe economic growth has been rapid since the completion, some 5 years ago, of the Marshall plan program for recovery from the devastation of World War II. Last year, as we know, there was a temporary setback resulting from the closing of Suez and subsequent currency speculation. One of the significant aspects of this economic emergency was that it was overcome very largely through normal trade and financial measures. Support for the pound sterling from the International Monetary Fund and the Export-Import Bank, accompanied by appropriate internal policies in Western Europe, prevented the kind of balance-of-payments crisis and widespread economic controls which would have characterized European reaction a few years ago.

Today the governments of Western Europe have staked their future economic growth on sound economic policies both internal and external. They have placed their faith in the competitive-enterprise system. They are trying to cope with inflationary movements by appropriate financial and

¹ Address made before the National Foreign Trade Council at New York, N. Y., on Nov. 18 (press release 633 dated Nov. 18).

² BULLETIN OF NOV. 11, 1957, p. 739.

monetary policies. At the same time they are seeking to expand the basis of their economic life through wider international trade—on a European basis through the European Common Market and Free Trade Area and on a world basis through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The collective-security system embodied in NATO is heavily dependent on the success of these efforts.

Japan, also, has emerged from the shadow of World War II. The period of emergency help from the United States has drawn to a close. Japanese economic life has regained its industrial vigor. The great need of Japan today is for a broader world market for her goods and services. Excessive restrictions by the rest of the world against Japanese trade can have no other effect than to straitjacket the Japanese economy, reduce the Japanese standard of living, and thereby breed conditions which could become politically explosive.

Latin America, almost alone among the developing areas, has achieved a very high rate of growth over the past several years—higher in fact than that of the United States or of Western Europe.

A short time ago I had the opportunity of visiting several of the Latin American countries and of talking with their governmental leaders on the occasion of the Buenos Aires Economic Conference, where I served as acting chairman of the United States delegation.³ I can only confirm what many American businessmen and officials acquainted with Latin America have been telling us: It is an area where the human drive for economic development, backed by great natural resources, is producing a tremendous upsurge in economic activity.

Here again we have an area of the world of great importance to the United States, where normal measures of international economic cooperation—private investment, public lending through the Export-Import and World Banks, and the reduction of barriers to international trade—are helping to produce conditions of economic progress. We should intensify all these measures of cooperation with our Latin American neighbors.

When we turn to the developing countries in Asia, the Near East, and Africa, we find a sharply

different situation. These are countries with the lowest standards of living in the world—some 700 million people whose per capita income is little more than \$100 per year. Moreover, the economic growth of these countries is barely keeping pace with the increase in population, with the result that many of their peoples see ahead of them little but seemingly permanent stagnation.

With respect to these countries, traditional methods of financial and trade cooperation, while important, are not enough. These countries are going through a rough period when they need exceptional help from the outside if they are to get over the early developmental stages. After that, there is reason to hope that they can move forward faster on the basis of their own resources.

Danger of Communist Penetration

The leaders of international communism are acutely aware of the opportunities open to them in the less developed countries of Asia, the Near East, and Africa, many of which are on the rim of the Communist bloc. The people of those countries are insistent that their conditions of life be improved. The central plank in the political platform of every government in the area is economic development and more economic development. If the free governments in these countries cannot deliver on their economic promises to the people, they will be in constant danger of being replaced by some form of totalitarianism.

It is on this economic issue that Communist propaganda is most dangerously effective. For the Communists point to the great increases in national economic growth which they themselves have achieved, while concealing the terrible sacrifice in lives, liberty, and living standards which made those increases possible. It is no accident that the Soviet programs of foreign trade and foreign loans, which are being conducted on a much greater scale today than a few years ago, are concentrated in these areas of the free world where living standards are the lowest.

Since 1954 the Soviet bloc has extended credits totaling \$1.1 billion to underdeveloped countries in Asia, the Near East, and Africa. About two-thirds of this amount has consisted of loans for development purposes. Soviet loans are making possible the construction in these areas of such projects as steel mills, manufacturing plants for

³ For a statement by Mr. Dillon at the close of the Conference, see *ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1957, p. 539.

heavy machinery and optical glass, power stations, irrigation systems, and mining industries—to mention a few.

These Soviet offers of financial assistance are intended to serve the political purposes of international communism. They are accepted by the recipient countries because these countries are desperately searching for more capital to speed their economic development.

It is clearly in the national interest of the United States to do what it can to hasten the processes of economic development in these areas, thus helping them to resist the forces of Communist penetration. For if the Communists were to be successful in winning these peoples to their cause, the whole of the free world would be gravely endangered.

The world economic setting of today, which I have attempted to sketch very briefly, demands positive, forward-looking programs by the United States in the foreign economic field. What we need at this juncture of world events are not "crash" programs of an emergency character but sustained long-term programs directed to the basic economic problems I have described.

First, we must strengthen normal trade and financial relationships among all areas of the free world through the reduction of trade barriers and currency restrictions, the promotion of private investment, and the stimulation of supplementary public lending through the Export-Import Bank, the World Bank, and the International Finance Corporation. The vigorous pursuit of these objectives over the next several years is especially important to continued economic growth in Western Europe, Japan, Latin America, and large parts of the British Commonwealth. It is also important to the health of our own economy, which is increasingly interdependent with the rest of the world. And, finally, it is essential to the economic and political cohesion of the international system of free societies of which we are a part.

It has always seemed to me that American business has an especially important stake in the success of our efforts to free trade and stimulate development—over and above the increased volume of business that this would bring. Unless trade is freed from restrictions and unless countries develop, American business will find it im-

possible to operate abroad in the free, competitive manner which has become the American tradition. Rather, it will find itself faced with government enterprises and state trading organizations, which will change the whole nature of international business as we know it and as we want it. Our trade and investment programs are vitally important to American business in the context of its own future.

Second, we must supplement our normal trade and financial programs with special help to those countries whose standards of living are very low, particularly in Asia, the Near East, and parts of Africa. Traditional trade and financial measures, larded with sporadic applications of short-term grant aid, will not work. What we need is a long-term program geared on a businesslike basis to the realities of economic life in these areas.

These two objectives are not put forward as an idealistic blueprint for the future. On the contrary, they are practical objectives which are rooted in the world economic situation facing us at this moment. We must pursue them now if we are to exercise leadership in the period immediately ahead.

Each of these objectives will be tested next year in the fires of congressional and public debate when two major legislative proposals will come before the Congress for consideration. These are the reciprocal-trade-agreements legislation, which is essential to the first of the two objectives I have outlined, and the appropriation for the Development Loan Fund, which is essential to the second. I should like to give you my views on each of these legislative proposals.

Trade-Agreements Legislation

There is no instrument of American foreign economic policy which has been more influential over a longer period of time in advancing the interests of the United States than the authority given to the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign governments. The trade-agreements program has, in truth, been a cornerstone of American foreign economic policy as well as a powerful aid to the growth of the American economy. Helped by trade agreements, our exports have expanded to record levels.

The President's authority to participate in new tariff and trade-agreement negotiations will automatically terminate on June 30 of next year unless

Congress takes the necessary action to extend it. Some people propose that the trade-agreements legislation should now be allowed to die. I suspect, however, that this would be generally recognized as an extremist viewpoint. There is unquestionably broad public support for the program as a whole, based on its undoubted successes. And, while there has been intense opposition in some quarters, I would doubt that its opponents really believe that the program should be killed outright. It is much more likely that the real debate will be centered not on whether to extend the program or to discontinue it but on such questions as the length of time for which the program should be extended, the extent to which the President should be authorized to reduce tariffs, and the operations of the escape clause which gives protection to American industry.

These, of course, are fundamental issues. If, for example, the legislation is extended for too short a period or if the authority granted is too small, then, even though the Trade Agreements Act may still be on the books, it would be a dead letter. It would be of no help in meeting the economic challenge which now faces the United States and the rest of the free world.

The Trade Agreements Act should, I believe, be extended for at least 5 years if it is to be effectively used.

The trade-agreements law, which was originally enacted in 1934, has now been extended by Congress on 10 separate occasions, usually for a 3-year period but sometimes for only 1 or 2 years. The tradition of a 3-year extension was established back in the depression years of the 1930's when trade agreements were concluded on a bilateral basis. Now, as we approach the 1960's, the principal instrumentality for making the trade-agreements authority effective is no longer a series of bilateral trade agreements but a single multilateral mechanism, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The General Agreement began with negotiations among 23 countries 10 years ago, but it has now grown to include 37 nations. Today, therefore, tariff negotiations are conducted simultaneously among a large number of countries. Accordingly, they require more time and more preparation than in earlier days. The tradition of the 1930's for a 3-year extension of the trade-agreements legislation is, in short, not well suited to today's situation.

European Common Market

Next year there will also be a special and very important reason for extending the trade-agreements authority for at least 5 years. In January the treaty establishing the European Economic Community will come into force. Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, the six governments which have signed the treaty, will then be committed to establish a European Common Market leading to the full integration of their economic systems. This is a truly revolutionary step toward European unity to which the United States has given its full support.

Economic adjustments, however, will be inevitable as the European Economic Community comes into being. It is essential that these adjustments take place in a way which will help the Community to become an outward-looking organization, in accordance with the declared objectives of the six governments, rather than an inward-looking and restrictive group which closes the doors of trade with the rest of the world. In the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade we have established general principles designed to make sure that arrangements such as the European Common Market will not result in higher barriers to world trade than existed before. But the actual establishment of the common tariff by the European Economic Community is a complex matter which will take some years to achieve. In order to keep this common tariff as low as possible a series of tariff negotiations will be necessary between the Common Market countries and all the other countries belonging to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including the United States.

These negotiations cannot be arranged for and carried through to completion in less than 5 years. It is our strong conviction that the Trade Agreements Act should, therefore, be extended for at least this period.

I am not going to speculate on whether the Presidential authority to reduce duties should be X, Y, or Z percent. I will only say that the degree of authority to reduce our tariffs should be adequate to enable the United States to conduct meaningful negotiations which will result in useful tariff concessions for the benefit of American exports. A bare minimum of authority will not be enough to accomplish this purpose. Tariff reductions should, however, be gradual, and they

must, of course, be decided upon with great care in the light of the situation of particular domestic industries.

In addition to extending the power of the President to enter into effective trade-agreement negotiations, it is important that the Congress should now approve the legislation which has been before it since 1955 to authorize participation by the United States in the Organization for Trade Cooperation. The OTC would not affect American tariff and trade regulations. There is no need for any domestic industry to be apprehensive on this score. On the other hand, OTC would enhance the effectiveness of the trade arrangements already agreed upon in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This would benefit our export trade. Our failure to approve OTC would deny to American industries the use of improved administrative machinery to make certain that they obtain benefits previously negotiated by the United States on their behalf.

Development Loan Fund

The second major piece of legislation in the foreign economic field which will be considered by Congress next year is the appropriation for the Development Loan Fund. In establishing the fund last summer the Congress recognized the need for new concepts and new techniques in extending economic assistance to the less developed areas of the free world. The fund was set up, with a small initial appropriation, after a thoroughgoing and critical reexamination of the mutual security program conducted by numerous public and private agencies, including the executive branch, two committees of the Congress, and several universities, business groups, and private research institutions.

Out of this reexamination a number of important conclusions emerged, which I shall summarize briefly:

First, the United States has a vital foreign-policy interest in the economic development of the low-standard-of-living areas of the free world.

Second, special financial assistance by the United States in a form which will reinforce private investment and normal public lending, without interfering with either, is required for this purpose and will be required for some time to come.

Third, such special assistance should be long-term rather than short-term if true development

is to be promoted, should be in the form of loans rather than grants if economic incentives are to be preserved in the developing countries, and should be extended on an individual project basis rather than on an overall country basis if technically and economically sound development is to be realized.

Fourth, economic assistance for development purposes should be labeled as such. It should not be confused with, or concealed under, defense support, military aid, or other types of assistance provided for in the mutual security program. This is essential to public understanding and confidence as well as to governmental accountability.

Fifth, such assistance should be administered on a businesslike basis through a banking mechanism, such as a development fund, rather than in a manner which would require Congress each year to authorize and appropriate funds on the basis of tentative plans.

The Development Loan Fund is now being organized. The legislation provides for a Loan Committee, consisting of myself, the president of the Export-Import Bank, and the director of the International Cooperation Administration, to establish basic terms and conditions for the fund's operations. Loan inquiries and proposals are beginning to come in and are being reviewed in the light of the fund's objectives. The fund's operations will not be confined geographically, but countries with the lowest living standards will have a priority call. All of us who are concerned with the management of the fund will cooperate fully with private investors and established lending institutions to make sure that the fund will in no way compete with them but will, on the contrary, stimulate their overseas activities as much as possible.

However, the future of the Development Loan Fund is not yet secure. For, in authorizing the fund, the Congress appropriated only a portion of the resources needed to make the fund a continuing and effective institution. Congress appropriated only \$300 million for the fiscal year 1958. It also authorized the appropriation of \$625 million for the fiscal year 1959. If the fund is to be something more than the old mutual security program under another name, it will have to be given enough capital resources, free of annual appropriation requirements, to enable it to establish the confidence necessary to its long-term purposes.

As a minimum, Congress should now appropriate the full amount of \$625 million already authorized, thus bringing the fund's capital resources to \$925 million. Although this is short of the full requirement, it should be enough to establish the fund on a firm footing.

The two programs I have described—a strengthened trade-agreements program and an adequate Development Loan Fund—do not add up

to the whole of our foreign economic policy, which embraces many other economic activities ranging from investment treaties to civil aviation. But these two programs are fundamental. Without them, little else that we can do will serve to protect our vital national interest in strengthening, as we must, the economic and political institutions of the free world.

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of November 19

Press release 636 dated November 19

Secretary Dulles: Go ahead with questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the light of comments which you have made about creating a NATO stockpile of atomic weapons and which Defense Secretary McElroy has made about having some missiles bases in Europe, is it proper to say, or could you tell us whether you are contemplating negotiating for a system of atomic missiles bases in the NATO area in Europe?

A. Well, we already have an understanding with the United Kingdom, which is part of the NATO area in Europe, which was arrived at at Bermuda last March.¹ It is quite likely that we will explore the possibility of somewhat similar arrangements on the continent of Europe. Those negotiations will, presumably, be conducted, in the first instance, with General Norstad, as the Supreme Commander for the European area, and would, we hope, result in the possible placing of some of those missiles on the Continent under similar conditions to those which have already been negotiated out with the United Kingdom with respect to warheads.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, there are persistent reports that our European continental allies don't want—particularly in respect to the IRBM, the intermediate-range missile bases—that they feel that, according to these dispatches, it would make them a target for Russian reprisals and that the only thing that would encourage

them would be a more direct participation in the way these bases are run. Do you have any comment on that, sir?

A. My comment is, first, that obviously we are not going to force these missiles on anybody that doesn't want them. The second comment is that General Norstad, when he was here a few days ago, discussed the matter with me and indicated that in his opinion they were very much desired. My third comment is that there would be a very considerable measure of allied participation in the handling of these missiles.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Secretary of Defense referred to the possibility of negotiating treaties. What is the legal position there? Does the executive not have authority on its own, so that it could negotiate those without the consent of the Senate?

A. I think the word "treaty" was used by the Secretary of Defense in its broad significance as an "agreement" and not within the technical meaning of an agreement of the type which has to be submitted to the Senate for ratification. We believe that these matters can be carried out by the executive under its authority, as was the case with the agreement with the United Kingdom, and that they would not have to have a treaty in the technical, legal sense of that word.

Q. Would that apply also in atomic warheads?

A. Yes, because, of course, our arrangement with the United Kingdom also involves the placing there of atomic warheads. Now they are still under the technical custody of the United States,

¹ BULLETIN OF APR. 8, 1957, p. 561.

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in accordance with the provisions of the act. I doubt whether it will be necessary to change those particular provisions [of U.S. law insofar as they might be applicable in any future agreement with the Canadians, for example]. It is contemplated they will work out satisfactorily with the United Kingdom, which is still prospective but where the terms in that respect have been agreed upon; and a certain technical custody is quite compatible, I believe, with the views of SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe]. We understand, of course, that in the event of war the President, under his war powers, would be able to turn them over to the allies in that war who would previously have been trained and who would themselves possess the equipment for using the atomic or nuclear warheads.

Q. Could you clear up this point—I was not clear from your earlier answer: Are you contemplating bilateral agreements, such as the U.S.-U.K. agreement, between the United States and the continental countries, or were you implying that there might be a continental agreement with NATO, as such, on placing missiles?

A. I would think there could be an arrangement made with NATO-SACEUR. Now, of course, you run into a certain complication because of the fact that NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is not technically a legal entity, is not itself a corporate body, a governmental body. Therefore, the extent to which you get arrangements dealing, for example, with the infrastructure on which missiles would be based, on the location of these things—those arrangements would probably have to be made with the governments in which the territory is located that you are using. But, in the main, we would assume that the arrangements basically would be worked out by and through SACEUR; the implementation might in certain respects require action by individual governments.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when we refer to this NATO nuclear pool, are we just referring to the IRBM; and, if not, how does that arrangement differ from what is presumed to be the military situation in Europe today?

A. Well, when we talk about a NATO nuclear stockpile, we are talking about much more than the intermediate missiles, of the warheads for the

missiles. There are in existence today quite a large variety of nuclear weapons which are actually, many of them, in Europe at the present time. They are in Europe at the present time almost exclusively, I would say on the Continent exclusively, for the use of our own United States forces. These would become so situated that they would also be available to the forces of our allies.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is this agreement with Canada, which you implied a moment ago, on nuclear weapons?

A. Well, we have a system there, the Early Warning System, the DEW Line, and so forth, which [could be] reinforced by missiles which have nuclear components, [provided that satisfactory] arrangements [were made] with Canada in that respect.

Q. Are there nuclear warheads in Canada now?

A. Yes, I believe so, although I am not absolutely certain as to whether they are actually there or not. You would have to get that information from military sources. They are either there or in a position to be quickly put there.

Mr. Stevenson's Role

Q. There seems to be some confusion about the precise role that Adlai Stevenson is playing, or is going to play, in the State Department. Would you define that role for us and tell us exactly what he is expected to do?

A. Well, I can't define it any better than he defined it himself. He made a little statement in New York a few days ago indicating the role that he was prepared to play, and we accepted that.

Q. Will he come up with ideas and suggestions, or will he merely approve or disapprove of proposals and plans which you will give him?

A. We hope very much he will come up with ideas and suggestions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why did you pick Mr. Stevenson for this job? Was it merely that he is the titular head of the Democratic Party, or was there some other reason in your mind?

A. Well, we picked him because he was the titular head of the Democratic Party and, in addition, had had a considerable amount of international experience. He and I have worked together on a

good many occasions: at the San Francisco conference of '45; at the first meeting of the United Nations in London; and, again, at several of the United Nations meetings in New York. He has had several trips abroad; he has been around the world since then. So he is knowledgeable in this field and combines two characteristics which were desirable: one, the position of being titular head of the Democratic Party and, secondly, being knowledgeable in this field.

Q. Will he go to Paris for the NATO meeting?

A. I don't know about that. There has been no decision on it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to comment on the verdict and the sentence in the Girard case in Japan today?

A. I would say that the result indicates that there has been a very fair trial, as we assumed that there would be. I do not think that anyone who hasn't examined all the evidence should comment upon the precise verdict. I haven't studied the evidence in the case. But I have had reports which indicated that the trial has been thoroughly fair. Both sides have been heard, and I think it is an outcome which does credit, as we expected it would, to the Japanese system of justice.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you feel about the situation brought about through U.S. arms shipments to Tunisia?² How gravely do you view it, and what do you think can be done about it?

A. Well, it is obvious that this was one of these cases where there was no solution which would be entirely satisfactory to everyone; the United Kingdom and the United States took the course which they felt was the right course. It had been discussed at considerable length with the French before the action was taken, and we regret that the French feel as they apparently do about it. We hope that we will be able to work out an understanding for the future which will allay their apprehensions and avoid such differences arising in the future. I assume that will be one of the matters which Foreign Minister Pineau will discuss with me this afternoon.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you tell us your views concerning the recent joint Netherlands-Australia statement concerning the status and future

development of West New Guinea, particularly in view of the forthcoming discussions in the United Nations of the western part of the island?

A. Our position on that matter is similar to that which we took last year. That is a position of neutrality. The arguments pro and con are closely balanced. We do not see a clear case to be made for either side sufficient, we think, to enable us to take a positive position on one side or another. So that we will continue, I expect, this year to abstain on the resolution. That depends, of course, to some extent on what the ultimate form of the resolution is. But that's our present disposition: to take the same position we did in previous years.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have plans for a meeting this weekend with Mr. von Brentano. Could you tell us what the purpose of this meeting will be?

A. The meeting was suggested by the German Foreign Minister for the purpose, I think, of discussing together some of the problems that may come up at the NATO meeting. It is very desirable, of course, that there should be preliminary exchanges of views between NATO members before the meeting takes place. Various media will be sought for having those exchanges of views—to some extent by personal talks, talks with the ambassadors, through diplomatic channels. It was felt desirable by the German Government to have a personal exchange of views. I think that Chancellor Adenauer and the Foreign Minister are going to London next week, and it was thought useful to come and have an exchange of views with us before then. Naturally, we welcomed that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there going to be a meeting with the British and French foreign secretaries together?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment, sir, on the Philippine elections outcome and also what effect that might have on renegotiating our military-bases agreement with them?

A. The elections, as far as we can now judge, seem to have been conducted in a way which was creditable to the democratic process. The leading contenders were all persons who were com-

² *Ibid.*, Dec. 2, 1957, p. 882.

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mitted to close and friendly relations with the United States, and that applies, of course, to the President-elect, Mr. Garcia.

The question of these base agreements will, I hope, be brought to a successful conclusion. They were negotiated down to a rather small, I think, margin of difference, and then it was thought desirable not to press them to a conclusion during the election period. I don't know what the plans are for resuming those negotiations. They were conducted previously by the Department of Defense, primarily, and I have not had a recent discussion with them as to what their thoughts are about resuming the negotiations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will we speak with Germany about basing IRBM's there—with Von Brentano?

A. I don't think that we will start our discussions about our IRBM's with individual governments. I think our discussion in the first instance would be with the Supreme Commander, with SACEUR, as to what he thinks is a sound military disposition to make. If that discussion then leads to a result which calls for discussion with individual governments, that would take place at that stage. But that would not be the first stage of our discussions, as far as I am aware.

NATO Atomic Stockpiles

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask on one point you raised a while ago—you have always spoken, and I think that this discussion has been conducted, in terms of an atomic stockpile for NATO. Now, the implication of your earlier discussion here is that, in fact, to make those weapons available when and if needed, there would actually be several atomic stockpiles in the European NATO territory. Is this what you are thinking about studying?

A. Yes. When I speak about a NATO stockpile, I am not implying that all weapons would be in some single place. That would not be a prudent way to arrange it. There should be diversification, obviously. So that it would be stockpiles the locations of which would be determined by NATO and which would be designed for use by NATO forces.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in considering the political

aspects of this NATO meeting, do you conclude as of now that there is any necessity to go beyond the current NATO philosophy of "an attack on one is an attack on all"? In other words, do the other countries need a harder commitment of the American willingness to come to their aid if attacked than the one they now have in the NATO treaty?

A. No, I do not think so. I think the commitment, as far as the treaty is concerned, is as strong as it could be made. It is hard to get much further in an agreement than "an attack upon one is an attack upon all." That is, in turn, reinforced by the presence at the forward positions of American forces which would presumably be themselves attacked. So, in addition to the treaty obligation, there would be the exercise of the basic right and obligation of a commander to defend himself if attacked. I do not think that, as far as that aspect of the matter is concerned, there is need of any further reassurance. Now there is perhaps the broader question, which you may envisage, as to whether, if there should be an attack which would not involve United States forces physically on the ground, would there be a response in terms of the activities of the Strategic Air Command. I don't know whether that was the point of your question.

Q. That is, sir.

A. That, of course, is a matter it is not possible to give any legal commitments on beyond those we have given. That is part of the exercise of the President's authority as the Commander in Chief in time of war and how he conducts the battle. I think that there should be no doubt, and perhaps the next NATO meeting will be able to reinforce that conviction, that there is no doubt, but what in fact the United States would react through the Strategic Air Command in the event that the situation seemed to call for it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have we really got an operational IRBM, and, if so, have we got enough to be distributing them around to other countries?

A. No, we haven't got them at the moment. We have them in prospect. This would not be an operation which could be on instantly. I would suppose that the end of the next year, the next calendar year, would be about as soon as they would be coming out on an operational basis.

Arms Shipment to Tunisia

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that our shipment of arms to areas of tension, such as that sent recently to Tunisia, is really helpful in contributing to world peace arrangements?

A. Yes, I think that it contributes to world peace and contributes to the security of the free world by enabling free nations to feel a certain confidence in their ability to resist the efforts of communism to overthrow them either through open attack or through subversion, measures of that sort. I think that a limited amount of arms is an essential part of any independent nation's equipment. The charter of the United Nations says that there is an inherent right of collective and individual self-defense, and I believe that that justifies any independent nation in having at least a modest supply of arms, so that it cannot be taken over without even a gun fired. Now, when you get into a question of how big the supply should be, that is another problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with limiting arms to Tunisia, Foreign Minister Pineau has said that the limit should be one gun per soldier. Do you subscribe to that?

A. Well, I haven't any idea whether that is a sound limitation or not. That is a technical, military matter, and I don't know whether or not one gun per soldier is the right formula.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider that we still have an obligation to help Bourguiba complete the armament of his country, or has our obligation been fulfilled in this single shipment that was made?

A. Well, our obligation, to the extent that you want to call it an obligation, or commitment, was expressed, I think, last September, and it was to the effect that we believed that Tunisia, as an independent country and as a country which wanted to identify itself and was identifying itself with the free world and with the West, was entitled to procure from Western sources arms reasonably needed for its internal security and defense purposes. We did not commit ourselves to give the arms. We merely established what in our opinion was a sound general proposition, that it was justifiable for Prime Minister Bourguiba to feel that Tunisia was entitled to a

certain amount of arms for these purposes, and seeing that he preferred to get them from the West, we felt that he was entitled to get them from the West. We did not specify the particular sources.

Actually, of course, we would have been happy if he had gotten them from France and we would be happy in the future if he would get them from France, because the relations between France and Tunisia are historic, are many, and we would prefer to have the relationship carried out on that basis rather than upon a new arrangement with other countries. There probably are still some further arrangements to be made. As I say, I would hope that that would be made with the French.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the NATO meeting of Heads of Government in December reach final decisions on the development of the role of NATO as suggested by the Eisenhower-Macmillan communique,⁸ or will that meeting be more of a demonstrative character and leaving the final work of implementing ideas on the development of NATO to later meetings of military leaders and perhaps of foreign ministers?

A. I don't think that I can give a generalized answer to that question. I think probably there would be some actual decisions taken or commitments given at the meeting itself. Undoubtedly there will be quite a number of other matters which will be discussed in general and where the machinery and necessary agreements would have to be worked out subsequently, presumably under the auspices of Mr. Spaak, the Secretary General. But, as I say, I don't think you can say that it will be all of one thing or all of another. It will be partly one and partly another.

Use of Nuclear Weapons

Q. Mr. Secretary, some years ago, or a few years back, our European allies were said to have been fearful that we might have been trigger-happy in the use of our nuclear weapons. But now do you suggest that they might be, that they are, fearful that we might not use them if not attacked on the ground in Europe? Can you tell us what accounts for this change in attitude?

A. Well, I don't think that there is a change in

⁸ *Ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1957, p. 739.

their attitude. I think that there is a certain amount of feeling of concern on both counts. I think that the communique or the Declaration of Common Purpose issued by President Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan indicates that fact, where it points out that it is important that the allies should be reassured on both counts—one, that they will be used if there is a proper occasion and, secondly, that they will not be misused. The two concerns go hand in hand. It is exactly the same as though we were dealing with a police force here in the District of Columbia. Every citizen wants to be sure that the police force will be used to protect him in case of need. Also, we want equally to be sure that the policeman will not be going out in the street beating the heads of innocent citizens. Now, those are parallel concerns which are always felt when you are dealing with a collective-defense force of this kind. I think both concerns are felt and both are entitled to recognition and satisfaction.

Q. Would not the assurance that they would not be misused involve a veto on their part, and, if so, are we addressing ourselves to that problem?

A. No, I do not think this involves a veto on their part any more than an individual citizen has any veto over the action of the policeman on the beat. He is entitled to know that the circumstances under which the security force operates are such to give him reasonable assurance on these matters. I do not think any government can legally, constitutionally, give another government a veto over action which it might deem indispensable for its own national existence. So it's not a question of vetoes at all. It's a question of having sufficient knowledge and understanding, in the case of the United States, at least, of our thinking, of our planning, the kind of thing that we might do.

I would say that the concern is perhaps in the case of NATO that they want to be sure we use it if NATO is attacked. They are a little bit worried that we might misuse it in the Far East. In the case of SEATO, it's just the other way around. They are afraid that we might use it unnecessarily or prematurely in the case of NATO or in the Middle East and might not be willing to use it for their protection in East Asia. And I think the problem arises, in part at least, from the fact that the United States has farflung,

worldwide responsibilities and the members of these different collective-defense associations do not adequately know our thinking in relation to other areas. And we have perhaps got to find some way of a greater interlocking of knowledge and understanding, so that in one area they will not be worried or concerned lest we be unduly influenced to use or not use because of considerations which they are not aware of in relation to another area.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to get back to Mr. Stevenson for a moment, he has indicated that, if there were proposals that the administration had that he couldn't go along with, he would criticize them with you. Under your arrangement with him, who determines whether that criticism is made public?

A. Well, I suppose that Mr. Stevenson would determine that for himself. I would hope that he would act, I believe that he would act, with due regard for the end result that we are all, I know, seeking, which is to enhance the strength and unity of the free world. I am sure that that is very much in his mind. He wouldn't be here if he didn't feel that way. No doubt he would take that into account. But nobody is putting a censorship over Mr. Stevenson beyond what he himself imposes as a decent self-restraint in connection with the nature of his mission.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a few moments ago you said that you hoped to work out with Mr. Pineau arrangements so that it won't happen again that we have such a situation as we do in Tunisia. In view of hindsight and not shipping arms to Tunisia, what arrangements do you now see could have been made that this wouldn't have happened?

A. Well, as a matter of fact, we thought, up until the last few minutes almost, that the French were themselves going to deliver the arms to Tunisia. The evidence of that fact is that our planes which had these arms on them, which were on the bases in Libya, were unloaded and the planes were flown on another mission. So that when in fact the French arms were not delivered, we were in a somewhat embarrassing position of not having our own planes and arms ready to make the delivery. We were behind nearly 24 hours in our schedule, and it was because we had

assumed up to almost the last minute, the early hours of the morning, French time, that the French themselves were going to make the delivery.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned before that the limited shipment of arms to the areas of tension such as Tunisia was to prevent internal subversion. Hasn't it been fairly well demonstrated that economic security is a better deterrent in internal subversion than a limited military security?

A. I think it is probably better but it is never exclusive. We have a pretty good economic condition in this country, but that doesn't mean that we abolish our police force.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in a speech you made a few days ago, you spoke about giving up some marginal freedoms. This has caused quite a lot of speculation as to what you had in mind. Could you define it a little more?

A. I think that it may prove desirable to give up or delay or stretch out some of the domestic programs we have which are desirable but not vital, so that we can carry out programs which are vital. If we do not do that and run into a threat of unbalanced budget, we may have to have some controls, possibly standby controls, in relation to certain areas where inflationary pressure might make itself felt. I was only speaking in very general terms. I would say that the administration, as far as I am aware, has not any concrete proposals as yet to make in this respect.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with Governor Stevenson's mission, he has said that he won't draft policy, he won't formulate policy, but he will comment on it while it's in the process of formulation. Now, how is it possible for him to do that without actually participating in the formulation of the policy?

A. As I said, the statement about Governor Stevenson's purposes and intentions was formulated by him and I think probably he is the best interpreter of his own statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to clear up a point about the Tunisian arms. You said that we were going to fly the arms in. The point is that we unloaded

these planes at this airfield. Why were the planes loaded in the first place if we had not intended to supply the arms?

A. Well, we had first assured the Government of Tunisia that they would get arms by the end of October. That was a matter of public knowledge. Indeed, it was reported in a public speech made by Prime Minister Bourguiba. Then because of the fact that there was no French Government at the time and because the French Ambassador pleaded with us and the British to postpone, we got from President Bourguiba his agreement to postpone the date until the 12th of November. And that commitment on the 12th of November was a firm and definite commitment. We got ready in the normal course to carry that out.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you confirm the statement made by Mr. Richards that the French made a last-minute switch on the Tunisian shipments? And, second, is it possible to find a way to prevent a country like Tunisia to buy its arms from the Eastern countries? Is there a technical way?

A. I don't know whether you can properly call it a switch or not. But as I say, we had expected, or thought, that the French would themselves make a delivery of arms unconditionally on the morning of the 14th. We had been already bypassed as far as the date of the 12th was concerned in an effort to work this out. It turned out that the French proposal was not unconditional but had conditions attached to it which we had not anticipated and which were not found acceptable.

Q. One of these conditions was, I remember, that Bourguiba would not accept arms from the Communist bloc. Do you think this condition is unacceptable?

A. Well, I don't want to discuss here just what the terms or conditions were. There is some confusion in my own mind as to precisely what they were. They were variously interpreted in London and in Paris and in Tunis. The fact is that the arms delivery did not occur and we felt obligated to carry through on our promise.

Q. Thank you, sir.

The Significance of Latin America in the Free World

by Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs¹

The Pan American Society of the United States has honored me greatly tonight by assembling to hear this talk about Latin America, a subject on which you are already well informed. Yet it is this very comprehension of yours which makes it such a real pleasure to be here. Moreover, your foreknowledge permits me to get immediately down to cases.

Tonight I want to discuss "The Significance of Latin America in the Free World." It is my intention to underline a few basic truths and report some recent developments and trends. Together they place Latin America in a new and momentous perspective. They also offer hope in a turbulent world. They highlight the urgency of tackling and solving man's problems in this hemisphere. If we are successful in our quest, the Americas will continue to be a bright and penetrating beacon light of freedom and progress as they have been for nearly 4 centuries. We need not consider the other alternative because in the Americas the password is success.

Now what is the reason for such confidence? It is very simple. Latin America is many times blessed. Its greatest blessing beyond any question is the spiritual storehouse on which its people can draw. Their faith is deep and direct. For generations they have turned to God for strength and sustenance. They are doing it now. They will do it in the future.

I cannot exaggerate the importance of this great spiritual asset to the free world. Faith there is to withstand adversity, but, more important, their faith is a positive, dynamic force

against godless communism at this critical juncture of the world. We fortunately have it also here in the United States. It is precisely this common denominator of spiritual faith which binds the United States and Latin America most closely together. We must never lose sight of that truth in the conduct of our affairs with our neighbors. It is right and proper to concentrate our energies and our resources on material problems, but not at the cost of neglecting this spiritual relationship. It is precious.

Next, let us examine the human resources with which God has endowed Latin America. When we say Latin America has the fastest-growing population of any region in the world, what does it mean? Late in the 1940's, for the first time since the colonial period, the population of Latin America exceeded that of the United States. Since 1900, population in the southern three-quarters of the Western Hemisphere has tripled, and authorities believe it will triple again by the year 2000 or, in other words, reach approximately one-half billion. The same authorities predict that by then the number of people in Latin America will be more than double the number in the United States.

The population increase is not attributable to an extraordinary birth rate. Instead, it is the result of a remarkable reduction in the death rate. Through the efforts of peoples and governments alike, especially through projects to improve environmental sanitation and to control infectious diseases, impressive drops in mortality are being recorded.

These population figures reveal another noteworthy trend. Because the greatest gains in saving lives have been made among infants and chil-

¹ Address made before the Pan American Society of the United States at New York, N. Y., on Nov. 14 (press release 626 dated Nov. 13).

dren under 10 years of age, practically all of our sister republics face the future with unusually young populations. In most Latin American countries, for example, more than 40 percent of the population is under 15 years of age. This contrasts with the range in European countries of between 20 and 30 percent. A good example close at home is offered by Mexico. Recent studies indicate that 51 percent of Mexico's population is under 20 years of age. The comparable figure for the United States is 37 percent.

Now certainly we who are vitally interested and involved in United States relations with Latin America would not only be blind but clearly derelict in our responsibilities if we did not study the implication of these startling statistics. Both the huge numbers and the age level are portentous—even more so when they are related to the surging advance in education. Politically speaking, people will be better prepared to accept the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. Concomitantly, as the democratic processes are further refined—and here I should pay tribute to the pace-setting role already played by Latin America—there will prevail inevitably greater freedom and dignity for the individual. Consistent with our inter-American treaties and the principle of nonintervention, we shall try always to help those who work to perfect political institutions based on spiritual and moral principles, institutions that stand for the personal freedom and sanctity of every man and woman. Should I mention the need to put our own house in better order?

Role of the Organization of American States

Other developments in Latin America are just as arresting as population increases.

In the political field these changes have made and are making history. Perhaps the most notable development is to be seen in the increasingly significant role of the Organization of American States in the pattern of hemisphere relationships. This organization, the first and in many respects the most successful of the regional political systems with which the United States is associated, has been growing in prestige and in the scope of its activity. It reflects existing trends and fore-shadows new ones.

The success of the OAS is due to the fact that its basic principles are in harmony with the polit-

ical philosophy of the peoples of America. Like the precepts of our own religion, these principles bear restatement and restudy. Let's examine a few:

1. Member states respect each other's sovereign equality.
2. Member states will not intervene in each other's affairs.
3. Member states have the duty to settle disputes by peaceful means.
4. Member states are pledged to protect each other against aggression from any direction.
5. Member states agree to cooperate in the solution of mutual problems.

In times past, some countries, including our own, assumed roles which worked against the realization of these ideals. However, in Latin America today we see a determination to progress and the growth of a self-confidence which can only flourish when states, like individuals, realize they exist in an atmosphere of equal rights and freedom of choice.

As a consequence of the opportunity for self-development and self-expression provided by this new security, the political climate in Latin America is changing. Woman's suffrage is effective in all but one state, and every year measures are being taken to increase voting registration and to protect the secrecy of the ballot. Each nation is striving in its own way to realize its potential, and the trends toward constitutionality and political maturity are there for the world to see.

The third principle I cited, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, has been convincingly successful on numerous occasions. You will recall that last spring armed clashes occurred between Honduras and Nicaragua over a century-old boundary dispute. Despite strong feelings aroused in each of the countries by the conflict, they both appealed to the Council of the OAS. A five-nation committee was sent immediately to make an on-the-spot investigation. Within 24 hours after its arrival a cease-fire was agreed to. Within a few days the committee had obtained assurances from the two Governments that their forces would withdraw behind designated lines. By midsummer, an agreement had been reached to carry the dispute to the International Court of Justice.²

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 20, 1957, p. 811, and Aug. 12, 1957, p. 273.

In terms of hemispheric relations, this proven dedication to moral and legal principles means, simply, that war between American states is unthinkable. Would that other areas of the world could be similarly confident!

Sovereign equality, nonintervention, and the peaceful settlement of disputes provide the essentials for peace and progress in the American Republics. Yet the experience of World War II, and later the ruthless and imperialistic designs of atheistic international communism, resulted in the adoption of a fourth principle by the OAS and a history-making addition thereto. In the Rio Treaty of 1947 all states agreed that an attack on any single one would be considered an attack on all. The Caracas declaration of 1954 extended this doctrine by recognizing that, if international communism should gain control of the political institutions of any one American state, it would be a threat to the security of all and would call for consultation to consider joint action. This timely concept of collective security for the New World has served as a pattern for strengthening the entire free world.

Proposals for Strengthening the OAS

The last principle I want to review is our 21-nation pledge of cooperation in the solution of common problems. This pattern has been developing for a century and a half. It was formalized in the ratification of the OAS charter. In July of last year it was given new meaning and new impetus at Panamá when President Eisenhower met with other chiefs of the American states and suggested the consideration of means for transforming the OAS into an even more effective instrument in the economic, financial, social, and technical fields.

Pursuant to the President's suggestions, a Committee of Presidential Representatives was appointed and held three meetings at intervals in Washington. In May of this year the completed recommendations, products of earnest and careful study, were transmitted to the Presidents.³ There were in all 27 specific proposals. I shall touch briefly on a few of them in order to suggest their long-range implications.

³ For a statement on the Committee's report by President Eisenhower, together with a Committee announcement at the conclusion of its final meeting, see *ibid.*, June 24, 1957, p. 1014.

Outstanding was a recommendation for the creation of an inter-American nuclear energy commission. It was the Committee's view that such a commission was needed to assist in the development of a coordinated plan for research and training in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to promote the interchange of scientific and technical information, and to coordinate activities with other international organizations.

Another recommendation of the Committee of Presidential Representatives calls for expanded activities of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, including the foundation of a research center in the south Temperate Zone and also a suitably located regional center for research in the diseases which affect bananas and cacao. Other major proposals asked full support for a program of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau to eradicate malaria from the Western Hemisphere in the near future and for a new and substantial program of scholarships to be made available by the OAS to member countries.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the Organization of American States. Vital as it is to the United States and to Latin America, I wonder if the organization has not enhanced its value by serving as an example to the rest of the world of what a regional grouping of states can actually do if they dedicate themselves to cooperate in like manner? Its significance was best described by Secretary Dulles recently:⁴

The Organization of American States is the greatest advance that the society of nations has made. And its organisms, its arrangements for the settlement of disputes between members, go far beyond anything that is contained either in the United Nations or in the North Atlantic Treaty or the Southeast Asia Security Treaty organizations.

Some Impressive Economic Advances

Now let us examine some of the impressive economic advances recorded in Latin America. Over the past 25 years, the annual rate of population increase has been $2\frac{1}{4}$ percent. At the same time, even though millions of additional people have to be included in the tabulations each year, the rate of production *per person* has also increased about $2\frac{1}{4}$ percent each year. In short, production development is running ahead of population expansion.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 4, 1957, p. 715.

Here are a few indices to some of the basic factors:

Transportation, as we all know, is one of Latin America's biggest problems. That solutions are being found is indicated by airline and highway figures.

In a survey of air miles covered inside the area by 10 Latin American public carriers having comparable data available for a given period, we find that these 10 companies alone flew 100 million miles in 1955 as compared with 30 million miles in 1946. The same airlines carried 5 million passengers in 1955 as contrasted with the 1 million carried in 1946. Authorities believe that the carriers accounting for these figures handle about one-half of the total inter- and intra-country air traffic and that the increases would be even more revealing if records were available for all.

Even though highway and feeder-road construction in Latin America has reached boom proportions since World War II, a bigger boom is in prospect. Inclusive figures are not available, but two or three examples at hand tell the story. In the next 5 years, Brazil plans to add 6,500 miles of new roads and improve 2,000 miles of its existing system. Colombia last year started on a \$400 million highway program which it expects to complete by 1960. And Mexico, of course, is setting a heady pace. In 1955 there were 200 or so miles of paved roads in that country. Today the total is more than 12,000, and an estimated 1,000 miles more are being added each year.

As a footnote on highway development, I should like to mention that our southern neighbors last year purchased 51 percent of all United States exports of trucks, buses, and chassis.

Another key to industrial progress in Latin America is the remarkable expansion over a 6-year period of electric power facilities. Consumption of hyroelectric energy rose 40 percent between 1950 and 1956. Practically all available data indicates that power demand will double in the next 10 years.

In discussing the economic future of Latin America there is frequently a tendency to emphasize industrial expansion and potential at the expense of agricultural development. Agriculture is still the backbone of Latin American economy, and more than one-half of its labor force is employed in crop production and distribution. Most countries, of course, depend heavily on agri-

cultural exports to provide funds for needed imports.

Fortunately Latin America has room and opportunity for development. Only 5 percent of the region is under cultivation, yet an estimated 25 percent is land on which farming could be profitably conducted. Irrigation, drainage, land clearance, and resettlement projects are some of the means being employed to bring additional acreage under cultivation. In Peru, for example, public and private programs are under way which will, within 5 years, add 500,000 acres to the 1,200,000 acres now under cultivation—an increase of 40 percent. Mexico again presents another convincing illustration. It established a National Irrigation Commission in 1926, and its program has benefited an area of 14½ million acres. With the opening of these new lands Mexico's annual production of food and fiber for its growing population and for export has vastly increased. Throughout Latin America the conquest of new land is going forward.

In addition, of course, new techniques in farming, improved fertilization, diversification of crops, and other modern methods are being employed to increase the yield. These advances have been accelerated over a period of years through the close cooperation of Latin American and United States technicians in the joint agricultural *servicio* programs.

Economic Conference at Buenos Aires

We in the United States have a full and sympathetic understanding of the problems which confront our hemisphere colleagues when the prices they receive for their exports sharply decline in the world market. The very lifeblood of their economy is at stake. We must appreciate, too, that such adjustments have political as well as economic impact, and in order to comprehend this impact we have only to consider the protests and the pressures which build up in our own country when similar situations arise. At the recent economic conference in Buenos Aires⁵ I was greatly impressed by the manner in which the delegates

⁵ For text of an address by Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson at the Economic Conference, see *ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 463. For statements by President Eisenhower and Deputy Under Secretary Dillon at the close of the Conference, together with the text of the Economic Declaration, see *ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1957, p. 539.

from various Latin American countries faced up to this vital and complex subject. After the healthful airing of divergent views and serious discussion based on available information, a resolution of the conference called for the establishment of a permanent committee by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States. This committee is to study and make public information with respect to the production, marketing, and other aspects of the products involved.

The United States itself has, of course, a responsibility in this area. Two-thirds of all imports from Latin America are free from tariffs. Under the trade agreements program started in 1934 duties on dutiable imports have been gradually lowered. Since the United States normally takes 45 percent of all the goods exported by the Latin American countries as a group and since almost every dollar earned in the United States by these countries is spent in the United States, our responsibility to ourselves and to our hemisphere partners is clear. This is one reason why this administration so strongly favors early action by Congress next year on the extension of the Trade Agreements Act.

The Buenos Aires conference also adopted another resolution in which we in the United States have a special interest. Just as our own country required huge sums of money for its progressive development, so do the countries of Latin America. There are only two sources for the capital needed, private funds and public funds. Based on its own development, financed chiefly through domestic and foreign private capital, and a recognition that there is a ceiling in every country beyond which public expenditures cannot safely go, the United States believes that a major portion of the money needed must come from private sources.

The resolution eventually agreed to at Buenos Aires calls on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council for studies designed to develop formulas and policies which would permit the expansion of Latin American economic development. It also includes, among other constructive clauses, a provision that member states should adopt measures conducive to encouraging, to the greatest possible extent, the flow of private capital toward Latin America.

My own view is that, as the people of the var-

ious countries come to understand that they too can tap—as we did in building our own country—the vast resources of domestic and foreign private capital, they will recognize that our emphasis on the *combined* roles of private investment with public loans serves the short-range as well as the long-range interests of the entire hemisphere.

This means that such credit institutions as the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Finance Corporation will continue to be available for conventional dollar loans and investments to finance sound projects. Public funds will also continue to be available from the International Cooperation Administration. In addition, Congress this year established a Development Loan Fund which will make long-term, low-interest loans, repayable in some cases in foreign currency, to finance sound projects for which the necessary credits have been unobtainable elsewhere. Funds from all of these sources are intended to be supplementary to private capital.

The United States Government is making and will continue to make every effort to encourage the availability of private capital for Latin American investment. Measures put forward to date include tax incentives, investment guaranties, bilateral trade treaties, and market studies. Their utilization depends, of course, on the attitude and policy of the other countries involved. Already private United States direct investment in Latin America totals more than \$7.4 billion with \$800 million being invested last year. The enterprises established employ local labor almost exclusively, operate under local laws, and pay local taxes. They likewise stimulate local economy by producing goods which otherwise might have to be imported, by earning foreign exchange through increasing exports, and by reinvesting earnings. An increasing number of these enterprises are joint undertakings in which Latin American and United States businessmen pool their capital in corporate or partnership entities.

On their part, many Latin American countries are taking constructive steps to attract private capital—private capital from their own investors, from the United States, and from third countries. These vary from country to country, but they embrace such effective measures as tax concessions,

reinvestment incentives, liberalization of exchange restrictions, legislation to protect investments, and other comparable actions. There is still much to be done in this respect.

Actually it would require a book to do even partial justice to the subject of economic developments in Latin America. I only trust that what I have reported here suggests the progress—and, yes, the *will* to progress—now evident in the Western Hemisphere community.

The March of Knowledge

One other changing pattern in Latin American life calls for review tonight. This might best be described as the quickening march of knowledge. Most of us are acquainted with the reputation our friends to the south have for a fighting press, but I wonder how many of us are aware that the number of daily newspapers published by them has passed the 1,000 mark. Just 2 months ago the highly respected *El Mercurio* of Santiago, Chile, celebrated its 100th anniversary.

The past few years have witnessed also unusual advances in another medium of information. Twenty-one and one-half million radio sets are in use in Latin America today, about 170 percent more than were in use 6 years ago. Although just being introduced in many cities of the area, television, too, is making its mark, with more than 1½ million sets in operation at the beginning of the year. And to round off this brief inventory of mass-communications facilities already available to the Latin American family we might note the fact that the total number of motion picture theaters open to them now exceeds 10,000.

Opportunities in the field of formal education are likewise multiplying throughout the area. Statistical records are not always available, but some of those which are suggest the trends under way. Let's examine a few figures relating to one highly important area of education, the secondary school. As many of you know, Latin America's secondary school is roughly equivalent to our high school; so gains made in that area are significant. In Chile matriculations in the secondary-school level increased 104 percent between 1940 and 1953, while the population increase registered 22 percent. In the 10-year period of 1940 to 1950 Brazil had a 135 percent increase in secondary-school matriculations and a 26 percent increase in population. Panama, between 1948 and 1953, recorded

a 53 percent increase in secondary-school attendance against a population increase of 14 percent. Mexico, between 1940 and 1954, increased secondary-school matriculations by 266 percent, while its population total went up 46 percent. One more sign of the times in Mexico is the fact that since 1953 its budget for public education has doubled.

There is other evidence attesting to the advance of education in Latin America. Many of the old and famous universities are being enlarged, and several new universities are being established. There is a steadily increasing exchange of students at the university level. Latin America is now sending us more than 9,000 such scholars per year. We are also exchanging professors at a faster rate and now have Fulbright agreements with seven countries in Latin America.

I shall conclude by trying to cast a critic's objective eye at the picture of Latin America painted tonight. It is overwhelmingly favorable. In spite of some serious problems, mostly stemming from explosive growth, the future looks bright. Yet there is no guaranty that it will remain that way. There is no room for complacency either on our part or the part of our neighbors. None of our problems will be solved automatically, whether of individual countries or of regional scope.

The fates of Latin America and the United States are inextricably intertwined. Our own country now bears the brunt of the responsibility in the free world for the protection of the principles which we hold dear, as well as our individual freedom and dignity. We can be grateful that Latin America, while geographically and economically linked with the United States, also is a defender in her own mighty right of those same principles and freedom. Her convictions about the urgency and the morality of the free-world crusade run just as deeply as ours.

What is required of all of us, 21 nations and some 350 million people, is unceasing vigilance and untiring effort. We must rededicate ourselves to provide the conditions to work and to live which will meet the aspirations of the people throughout the Americas. They will not be and should not be turned back from their goal of a better living standard for themselves, in their own lifetime, and for their posterity. This can best be achieved through individual initiative even

though governments also play a vital role. The responsibility of the United States is clear-cut, and we must never overlook it. We know that our own well-being and happiness depend in large measure on the well-being and happiness of others.

Cooperation will continue to be our watchword in the Americas. Fortunately we have a unique and intimate relationship. It is one we inherited from our forebears and one for which we should eternally be thankful. It is a spiritual kinship built on good faith. Out of it has emerged an invincible bastion of the free world.

Salute to Argentine Air Force

Following is an exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, Provisional President of Argentina, on the occasion of Argentina's Aviation Week.

Letter of President Eisenhower

White House press release dated November 12

NOVEMBER 6, 1957

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is a pleasure to send you greetings through General Curtis LeMay on the occasion of Argentina's Aviation Week. The United States Government appreciates the invitation cordially extended by the Argentine Air Force to its sister service in this country to join in this celebration. I am glad that we have this opportunity, through a salute to the Argentine Air Force, to demonstrate once again our warm friendship and regard for Argentina.

General LeMay's flight is a graphic demonstration of how rapidly technology is reducing the once formidable barriers of time and distance in communication between countries. It is stimulating to consider that in the very near future travel of the long distance between the United States and Argentina will require less than half a day, and to realize what this portends for relations between peoples. With science and technol-

ogy thus creating in effect a smaller world, common interests and mutual understanding become ever more important. I know that Argentina shares with the United States the same cherished belief in democracy and freedom and the earnest desire to realize an effective international cooperation dedicated to the achievement of peace and justice. I am confident, therefore, that as technological advances make communication easier, relations between our two countries and with all the other members of the family of American states will grow closer and stronger.

I have asked General LeMay to convey to your Government and the Argentine people the greetings of the people and Government of the United States, and to you my personal best wishes.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Letter of President Aramburu

White House press release dated November 14

NOVEMBER 12, 1957

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: General Curtis LeMay, in a memorable flight, has linked our two countries, bearing your kind message.

You correctly state that Argentina shares with the United States the same cherished ideals of democracy and liberty and the firm desire to cement effective international cooperation dedicated to peace and justice.

The profound and truly American content of your message constitutes a further strengthening of the ideals upheld by all the sister nations of the hemisphere.

I appreciate your views and also the sending of a distinguished delegation from the magnificent United States Air Force on the occasion of the XIIth Aviation Week, and I express the most fervent hope that progress in the technical field will bring our two peoples closer together.

With my very best wishes,

Cordially,

ARAMBURU

The Problems and Prospects of Sub-Saharan Africa: A United States Point of View

by Joseph Palmer 2d

The position of the United States in Africa is quite different from that of the European powers. We have no such history of direct responsibility in the area. We do, however, have interests of national importance to us which reach back far into our history. The newly awakened interest in Africa in this country often tends to ignore, for example, such footnotes to history as the facts that the United States had consular representation in Zanzibar before our British friends and that the coarse cloth in common use on the East Coast is still known as "Americani," a term which goes back to the trading days of the New England clipper ships. Nor should we forget the contributions of our missionaries and private philanthropic societies—the aid given to the founding of Liberia by the American Colonization Society.

From these early beginnings our citizens have vastly increased their contributions to the development and well-being of the African and, in return, have benefited from the spiritual and material strength of that great continent. Our total trade with Africa now reaches more than \$1 billion per year. The book value of our investments on the continent totals approximately \$500 million—not a very impressive figure but growing nevertheless. And who can measure the enormous contribution which has been made to our national character and development by that one-

Mr. Palmer is Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. This article is based on remarks he made at a Princeton University conference on "Emerging Sub-Saharan Africa" on October 16, 1957.

tenth of our population which had its origin in sub-Saharan Africa?

But it is not these somewhat narrowly national interests which I wish to emphasize today. It is instead a wider Western—a wider free-world—interest in the peace, stability, and prosperity of this vital area of the world. This is a matter which intimately affects the interests of all of us here today.

The position of responsibility which the United States occupies in the free world has as its inevitable corollary a position of interest and responsibility in Africa. It follows, as in other areas of the world, that we pursue policies and programs, not from any selfish motivation but to contribute to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the continent. In promoting these objectives we further our own national interests and those of others who think as we do.

It is against this background that we in the United States view the increasingly dynamic nature of the situation in Africa today and try to adapt our policies and programs both responsively and responsibly to these events.

Emerging Nationalism

I think most qualified observers would agree that the same dynamic forces—which, for want of a better term, we call nationalism—that have swept through Asia in this generation and have most recently made themselves felt in the northern parts of the African continent now are emerging in various forms in the south. It seems obvious that the success which the Western World demonstrates in accommodating itself to these forces may well be decisive in determining the

future orientation of whole peoples, whole areas, and perhaps the whole continent. Nor, in this connection, can we ignore the fact that rising African aspirations have in large measure been created by the impact of Western civilization itself. The West has deliberately exposed the African to its philosophies, its principles, and its ideals. It has created new social institutions. It has built great urban areas. But, as the African has become absorbed in these great undertakings, the traditional tribal nature of his society has in many parts of the continent become increasingly undermined. Under these circumstances the test of stability becomes one of whether the African absorbs his new values and disciplines before discarding the old and whether developing institutions exist to permit him responsibly to realize the benefit of those values. Where these criteria are not present or are imperfect, it is inevitable that pressures will build up for recognition in terms of political, economic, and social standing.

The inevitability of these pressures and the need for a gradual and responsible outlet for them has received widespread, although not universal, recognition in the West. The problem has become one of how to create the most desirable conditions possible in terms of educating an informed and discriminating citizenry, of building durable representative institutions, and of creating a stable economic and social infrastructure in the limited time available before the pressures become too great to contain. There are many emerging examples where the transformation to self-government and independence is proceeding smoothly and rapidly. We in the United States, of course, welcome such orderly transition and are anxious to do everything we appropriately should to facilitate it.

"Orderly Transition"

The policy of the United States toward this important and difficult question is, I believe, well known. In November 1953 Secretary Dulles stated in an address in Cleveland: "There is no slightest wavering in our conviction that the orderly transition from colonial to self-governing status should be carried resolutely to a completion."¹

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 30, 1953, p. 741.

It is, of course, a matter of the greatest importance that the word "orderly" be emphasized in this connection. It is axiomatic that membership in the family of nations carries with it responsibilities to the group. It is a matter of vital importance that this be known and accepted by emerging peoples. In the long run premature independence may contain as many dangers for Africa and Africans as the denial of that status.

I would like at this point to insert a further word of caution. In such a large area, inhabited by many different peoples and races with varying cultures and traditions, sweeping generalizations on the subject of nationalism are dangerous. In many parts of Africa where pressures are being felt the concept of a "nation" has not existed in the past and either the concept must be created or another form of political society must be developed which will satisfy the desire of the African to govern himself on a multi-tribal and multinational basis. The concepts of "federation" and "confederation" have spread in Africa with surprising speed in the past 3 or 4 years, and arrangements such as these may be the eventual solution in areas where there is no purely national tradition or sentiment.

New Relationship Between Africa and Europe

The essential problem that faces the West in this area is that of bringing about a new relationship between Africa and Europe in a manner which will assure the most beneficial results for both parties. I have already observed that these two continents are fundamentally complementary areas. We in the United States hope that the transition of Africa from a colonial to a national status will take place in a manner which will preserve the fruitful ties which bind the two continents together. If this is done, a basis will result for a new and perhaps more mutually beneficial relationship in which equality, cooperation, and interdependence will be the dominant themes.

To summarize on the question of colonialism and nationalism: The African people quite naturally look to the United States for support for their aspirations for political progress. The European powers equally naturally look to us for support for their efforts to assure peace and stability. We in the United States have a very real interest in a politically stable Africa and believe that this stability is dependent upon

steady and orderly political progress. We believe that only in this way will responsible, moderate, and positive elements emerge—in contrast to the extremist, disruptive, and negative nationalism which poses such dangers for us all.

Problems of Multiracial States

In general I believe that we in this country are encouraged by the remarkable progress which is being made in effecting the transition from colonial to self-governing and independent regimes. This has been particularly true in those areas where the population tends to be homogeneous. The problem is, of course, vastly more complicated in those areas in which there are important plural communities. This whole problem of relations between peoples of different races living together in multiracial states involves deep-seated emotions and prejudices which can only be overcome gradually. There are, of course, a number of different approaches to race relationships in Africa today, the spectrum ranging from countries in which the intermingling of races on an equal basis has become an accepted and unquestioned fact to countries in which separation of the races is a legal requirement.

In the light of our own experience in developing harmonious race relations and balancing precept with practice, it behooves us to approach racial problems elsewhere in the world in all humility. Nevertheless, the principles for which we stand are clear. They are embodied in our Constitution and in our Bill of Rights. They have recently been dramatically reaffirmed by our Supreme Court and by our President. In accordance with our traditions we are attempting to solve these problems by the process of orderly law enforcement.

It would not be appropriate for us, even if we wished, to become identified with any conflicting faction in Africa. We can, however, and while preserving our adherence to our own basic principle of racial equality, attempt to exert a moderating influence upon extremists and to oppose those who seek to exploit racial tensions for ulterior purposes. We have, in this connection, the strongest hopes for the success of the administering powers in their search for a basis for racial cooperation. In addition to the vital moral considerations involved, it is not, we know, an easy matter to bring about a full understanding

of the extent to which races in a particular community are interdependent.

Economic Development

This leads me to another of the great problems facing sub-Saharan Africa—that of economic development. The economic evolution of the area is moving rapidly from the barest subsistence to the point where the African is beginning to enjoy an increasing share of the world's great supply of consumer goods. This, in turn, is providing incentives to production and creating corresponding increased demands for capital. It is, perhaps, not too strong a statement to say that the success or failure of the moderate regimes in power today in the self-governing and independent areas of Africa may well ultimately depend on the extent to which they are able to bring about the economic and social development of their countries in a manner which will meet the aspirations of their people for a greater share of the world's bounty.

The Western World is generally agreed that Africa must have a faster and more balanced economic development. Articulate Africans will not be satisfied with a mere increase in productivity of raw-material exports. They clearly desire a more diversified use of their countries' overall productive capacities and to avoid the danger of excessive dependence on one or a limited number of crops which may fluctuate widely in price on the world market. Most of the European countries are undertaking extensive economic development programs which attempt to avoid concentration on raw-material production. Progress is limited by available capital funds—both public and private—and deficiencies in African physical and human resources.

It appears likely that the total capital requirements of sub-Saharan Africa will increase substantially in the critical years ahead. Certainly the demands will exceed the capabilities of any one Western nation to meet, and it therefore becomes a matter of the greatest importance and urgency that all of the Western nations should seek to assure that the necessary funds are available for a progressive and orderly development of the sub-continent. The United States has already demonstrated its willingness to assist in this task to the extent that it can, taking into account the heavy demands which are made upon it on a worldwide basis. We have been providing and

intend to continue to provide, in accordance with administration policy and subject to congressional approval, assistance to countries in the sub-Saharan region. Moreover, through the instrument of the Export-Import Bank we have made important loans in various parts of the area.

The amount of public capital available will, of course, be able to accomplish only a small part of the enormous task of development which lies before Africa. The demands for private capital will continue to be immense, and perhaps one of the most crucial tests which lies ahead is the extent to which the African areas are able to create the conditions of stability and confidence conducive to the attraction of private capital and to make known in the proper quarters each and every opportunity for attracting investment capital. Some areas of the subcontinent have already shown considerable success in creating such an atmosphere and in attracting capital. It is, I believe, a matter of the utmost importance that those of us who are in a position to do so seek to encourage the creation of such conditions everywhere.

The Problem of Communism

Before concluding I wish to say a few words about the problem of communism in the area as we see it. Thus far the Communists appear to have made only limited gains in this part of Africa. Nowhere does a Communist Party openly exist. Trade with Communist countries is still at a comparatively low level. African trade union movements have affiliated with the ICFTU [International Confederation of Free Trade Unions] rather than with the Communist-dominated WFTU [World Federation of Trade Unions]. But there is no room for complacency.

The Communists are openly eager to exploit the soft spots wherever they find them. Thus they have already shown some progress in penetrating individual labor organizations, youth groups, and nationalist organizations. They have assiduously cultivated students, particularly those studying abroad, with some success.

The greatest dangers of Communist penetration arise from factors affecting the attitudes of the West. Should the West falter in its determination and its ability to show steady progress in the solution of the range of problems which we have been discussing here, the road for Com-

munist exploitation will be clearly opened. I am confident, however, that there is too much wisdom in Africa and in the West to permit this to happen.

The political map of Africa has undergone tremendous changes in the 12 years of the post-war period. The number of independent states in the continent as a whole has more than doubled. The number of self-governing entities has shown an even greater increase. The dynamism of this situation becomes every day more apparent.

Response of the West

The response of the West to the challenge which Africa presents has, I believe, thus far been both rapid and effective. In all of the newly emerged independent and self-governing states we have moderate regimes which are friendly to the West and genuinely dedicated to the protection of their newly acquired status. This, I believe, is cause for great satisfaction, because this situation has not come about by accident. It has resulted from planning, cooperation, compromise, and mutual good will. It represents a recognition, by the administering powers involved, of the fact that the African peoples are capable with education and experience of conducting responsibly their own affairs.

The leaders of these new states have, for their part, recognized that in a sense their problems begin—not end—with independence and that their only real hope of building and maintaining the stable, peaceful, and prosperous regimes which their peoples demand is through continued co-operation with the West. They will, I am sure, be able to maintain these positions as long as the West continues to show itself sympathetic to their efforts at adjustment and responsive to their needs.

This is a situation, however, which will continue to require imagination and dedication. We must assure that the dynamism which is so apparent in Africa today is met by a corresponding dynamism in the West and that both forces are harnessed together to achieve the same objectives. In this way we can build a relationship based on equality, confidence, and mutual benefit which will provide an effective answer to the disruptive and self-seeking objectives which the Communists seek in this continent, as elsewhere.

Moroccan National Holiday

Following is the text of a message from President Eisenhower to His Majesty Mohamed V, King of Morocco, which was released at Rabat on the Moroccan national holiday, November 19.

On the happy occasion of the 30th anniversary of your accession to the Throne and the Moroccan National Holiday, I take great pleasure in extending to you and to the Moroccan people my warm personal congratulations as well as the best wishes of the people of the United States.

I look forward to your imminent visit to the United States, which will be a truly historic occasion. I know that my meetings with you will strengthen the longstanding ties of friendship between our two peoples as well as the cause of world peace.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Regulation of Travel of Soviet Citizens in U.S.

Press release 630 dated November 15

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

In a note delivered on November 11, 1957, to the Soviet Embassy at Washington, the U.S. Government has proposed the mutual abolition of closed zones in the U.S.S.R. and United States and has amended existing travel regulations applying to Soviet citizens in the United States to take into account amendments in Soviet restrictions on travel by foreigners which were communicated to the American Embassy at Moscow on August 28, 1957. In amending its restrictions the Soviet Government opened five cities in the Soviet Union, a number of smaller towns and tourist points around Moscow, and access routes to them. It closed approximately 120,000 square miles of Soviet territory which had formerly been officially open to travel by foreigners. These newly closed territories included a considerable portion of the Leningrad Oblast (district) although not the city of Leningrad, some smaller districts not far from Moscow, and an area of Central Asia lying between Alma Ata and Lake Balkhash.

In its note of August 28 the Soviet Government

stated that it was ready to discuss the opening on a basis of reciprocity of a number of closed cities and localities in the U.S.S.R. This Soviet offer follows a series of U.S. notes to the Soviet Government which pointed out that U.S. travel regulations were instituted as the result of Soviet restrictions and that the U.S. Government stands ready to reconsider its regulations if the Government of the U.S.S.R. is disposed to liberalize Soviet restrictions. In its reply of November 11, 1957, to the Soviet note of August 28 the U.S. Government proposed the mutual abolition of closed zones.

In revising U.S. travel restrictions in the light of the Soviet note of August 28, the U.S. Government has opened Philadelphia, Pa.; Boston, Mass. (except Charlestown); Buffalo, N. Y.; Kansas City, Mo.; Portland, Oreg.; Denver, Colo.; Flint, Mich.; Harrisburg, Pa.; and a number of smaller cities and localities. It has closed San Francisco, Richmond, Glendale, Pasadena, Long Beach, and a portion of Los Angeles, Calif.; Seattle and Tacoma, Wash.; a number of counties in Georgia, Florida, and Washington; and a number of other localities. The United States has closed approximately 45,000 square miles of U.S. territory, which is in the same proportion to the total area of the United States as the newly closed territory in the Soviet Union is to the total area of that country.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to note No. 335/Pr of August 28, 1957 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Embassy of the United States of America at Moscow which contained revised restrictions applicable to foreigners travelling in the U.S.S.R. Reference is also made to the note from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of January 3, 1955¹ in which it was pointed out that the regulations concerning travel by Soviet citizens in the United States are comparable to those which the Soviet Union had previously imposed on the movement of United States citizens in the Soviet Union.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 31, 1955, p. 193.

The regulations set forth in the Department's note of January 3, 1955, as amended, which apply to travel in the United States of certain Soviet citizens, are hereby revised as follows. These revised regulations will apply until further notice.

The following cities are now open for travel: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Boston, Massachusetts (except Charlestown); Buffalo, New York; Kansas City, Missouri; Portland, Oregon; Denver, Colorado; Flint, Michigan; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and Palo Alto, California.

The following cities and towns, with access by road along routes indicated, and access by rail or air in accordance with standing procedures, are now open for travel: Morrisville, Pennsylvania—access by U.S. route 1-1A from New York or Philadelphia; Princeton, New Jersey—access from New York or Philadelphia by U.S. 1 to Penns Neck, New Jersey 539 to Princeton; New Brunswick, New Jersey—access by New Jersey Turnpike to the New Brunswick tollgate, New Jersey 18 to New Brunswick; Metuchen, New Jersey—access by U.S. 1 from New York or Philadelphia to New Jersey 501, New Jersey 501 to Metuchen; Murray Hill, New Jersey—access from Elizabeth via New Jersey 82 past Springfield, southwest via New Jersey 512, to New Providence, southeast from New Providence to Murray Hill.

The following areas are now open for travel: Lake County, Tennessee; and Anne Arundel County, Maryland, south of U.S. 50 and the South River.

The following additional specified routes of automotive transit through areas closed to travel are authorized:

- (1) U.S. Route 1-1A between New York and Philadelphia and intermediate open points;
- (2) New Jersey 73 between Interchange No. 4 on the New Jersey Turnpike and Philadelphia;
- (3) New Jersey Route 38 between Camden and the intersection of New Jersey 38 and New Jersey 73 east of Camden.

The following cities are now closed to travel: Seattle and Tacoma, Washington; San Francisco and Richmond, California.

Los Angeles, Glendale, Pasadena and Long Beach, California are closed to travel with the exception of that area of Los Angeles and other cities defined below, which is now open:

That area of Los Angeles (including Universal City and Culver City), Burbank, and Beverly Hills bounded by: the Los Angeles River on the North from Sepulveda Boulevard to Olive Avenue; Olive Avenue Northeast from the Los Angeles River to Victory Boulevard; Victory—Riverside Boulevard from Olive Avenue Southeast to the Los Angeles River; the Los Angeles River Southeast to North Broadway; North Broadway—Broadway Southwest to Slauson Avenue; Slauson Avenue West to Sepulveda Boulevard; Sepulveda Boulevard North to the Los Angeles River.

The following counties in the State of Washington are now closed to travel: Skagit; Whatcom; San Juan; Island; Kitsap; Clallam; Jefferson; Mason; Grays Harbor; Pacific; Wahkiakum; Chelan; Okanogan; Stevens; Ferry; and Pend Oreille.

The following counties in Georgia are now closed to travel: Liberty; McIntosh; Glynn; and Camden.

The following counties in Florida are now closed to travel with the exception of the cities of Jacksonville, Miami and Miami Beach: Nassau; Duval; St. Johns; Flagler; Volusia; Brevard; Indian River; St. Lucia; Martin; Palm Beach; Broward; Dade; and Monroe.

Stanislaus County, California and Snyder County, Pennsylvania are now closed to travel.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its note of August 28, 1957 stated that it was ready to discuss with the United States Government the question of opening a number of cities and localities in the U.S.S.R. for visits by foreigners on a basis of reciprocity. In this connection, it should be recalled that in its note of March 10, 1952² the United States Government indicated that travel regulations for Soviet official personnel in the United States were being instituted because of the action of the Soviet Government in restricting United States personnel in the U.S.S.R. The United States Government would prefer the mutual abolition of all zones in the United States and the U.S.S.R. which are closed to travel or visits by citizens of the other country and hereby proposes such abolition of closed zones.

NOVEMBER 11, 1957.

² *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 451.

TEXT OF SOVIET NOTE

No. 335/Pr

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to announce the following changes introduced into the lists of points and localities in the U.S.S.R. forbidden for visits by foreigners which were announced in the Ministry's notes No. 295/Pr of June 22, 1953, and No. 400/Pr of November 12, 1953,² and also in the procedure for preliminary notification of trips of the chiefs and personnel of diplomatic missions on the territory of the U.S.S.R.:

1. Excluded from the list of points and localities of the U.S.S.R. which are forbidden for visits by foreigners are the cities of Riga, Lvov, Chernovtsy, Uzhgorod, Irkutsk, and also the cities and points in Moscow Oblast of Leninski Gorki, the Abramtsevo Museum—Country Seat, Istra, Zvenigorod, Solnechnogorsk, Senezhskoe Lake with a radius of not more than six kilometers, Drakino and Lipetsy (on the Oka River in Serpukhovski Raion).

Travel to the cities and points of Moscow Oblast mentioned above is allowed in transit:

To Leninski Gorki via Kashirskoye Shosse;

To the Abramtsevo Museum—Country Seat via Yaroslavskoye Shosse to Ryazantsy and on westward to Abramtsevo;

To Istra via the Volokolamskoye Shosse;

To Zvenigorod via the Minsk Shosse to Golitsyno and beyond by Zvenigorod Shosse;

To Solnechnogorsk and Senezhskoe Lake via the Lenigrad Shosse;

To the inhabited points Drakino and Lipetsy in Serpukhovskii Raion via Simferopol Shosse.

2. Additionally included in the list of points and localities of the U. S. S. R. closed for visiting by foreigners are:

Vysokinichskii, Ugodsko-Zavodskii, and Borovskii Raions of Kaluzhskaya Oblast;

Struninskii, Kirzhachskii, and Pokrovskii Raions of Vladimir Oblast, the city of Karabanovo, and the territory of the Makhrinskii Village Soviet of the same oblast;

Travel by the Ryazan Shosse beyond 23 kilometers from Moscow;

The part of Leningrad Oblast to the West of the Volkov River, with the exception of the City of Leningrad, a 30

Kilometer zone around it, and the points of Zelenogorsk, Petrokrepost, Pavlovsk, Gatchina, and Petrodvorets; Frunze Oblast of the Kirgiz S. S. R.;

The part of Dzhambul Oblast to the East of the Railway line Myn-Aral, Lugovoi; the Taldy-Kurgansk and Alma-Ata Oblasts of the Kazakh S. S. R.

The cities of Frunze and Alma-Ata remain open for visits by foreigners. Travel to these cities is permitted by rail or air.

3. Preliminary notification about trips of the chiefs and personnel of diplomatic missions on the territory of the U. S. S. R. must be sent to the Protocol Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Section of External Relations of the Ministry of Defense of the U. S. S. R. in writing forty-eight hours before the beginning of the trip. In reckoning this period, non-working days are excluded.

4. The Ministry states that it is ready to discuss with the Embassy the question of the exclusion from the list of points and localities in the U. S. S. R. forbidden for visits by foreigners of a number of cities and localities in the U.S.S.R. on a basis of reciprocity.

August 28, 1957

Moscow

Liberia, Peru, and Ecuador Waive Fingerprint Requirement

Press release 640 dated November 22

Liberia, Peru, and Ecuador have agreed with the United States to waive, on a reciprocal basis, the fingerprinting of nonimmigrant visa applicants.

As a result of separate agreements, which became effective October 18, 1957, for Peru nationals, November 7, 1957, for Liberian nationals, and November 19, 1957, for Ecuadoran nationals, no nation in the world now requires the fingerprinting of Americans for nonimmigrant visas.

On October 10, 1957, it was announced that fingerprinting would no longer be required by the United States for nonimmigrant visas in most categories,¹ except for the three nations mentioned above.

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1955, p. 197.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 28, 1957, p. 682.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.N. Committee Approves Revision of Refugee Program

Following is a statement by George Meany, U. S. Representative to the General Assembly, made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on November 8, together with the text of a 13-power draft resolution adopted by the Committee on November 12.

STATEMENT BY MR. MEANY

U.S. delegation press release 2800

My Government, in association with 12 other governments, has sponsored the resolution which is before this Committee in document A/C.3/L.639. My Government strongly supports this resolution and the objectives which it represents. I should like, therefore, to make a statement about this resolution and most particularly about these objectives.

My Government, as we have previously stated, believes that the institution and the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees plays an essential role in the world today. We deplore the conditions which make this role necessary. We have taken many actions, alone and in cooperation with other nations, to ameliorate these conditions. Nonetheless, refugee problems and refugees in need of assistance continue and will continue so long as the political conditions which create them exist in the world.

My Government supports the extension of the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and his office for an additional period because the protection he provides is still needed. It is not enough, however, that there be a High Commissioner; he must also have a program to carry out, a program directed toward finding permanent solutions for the problems of all refugees within his mandate who are in need of his assistance. It is toward such a program that the present resolution is addressed.

Most of us here in this room have already expressed our warm appreciation and approval of

the results which the High Commissioner's current program—the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund program—has been able to achieve and will still achieve before its termination on December 31, 1958. The United States, which has played an active and, we hope, a constructive role in the formulation and support of the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund program, heartily endorses this approval.

The United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund program was created in 1953 and represented the best thinking and the best planning which the interested members of the United Nations were able to bring to the problem as it then appeared. The support which the program has since received from many governments is ample evidence that this thinking and this planning were sound.

At the same time, my Government feels that the additional experience now available to us, and most particularly the experience we have gained from the operation of the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund program itself, indicates that we should consider a somewhat different type of operation for the future.

Basis for U.S. Support

At the risk of some repetition, I would like to make very clear certain fundamental principles upon which United States support of the present resolution is based.

1. The United States supports the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and believes that he must have an effective program. We expect to continue to support such a program in the future as we have supported it in the past.

2. The United States feels that the refugee problem is a dynamic and not a static problem. It continually changes in its dimensions, in its nature, and in its location. It is constant only in one respect: that it will continue to exist so long as conditions exist which create it.

3. This being so, we feel that it is not a problem which can be defined at once for all time. It cannot be met by establishing a program for a

specified number of years with a specified amount of money. Long before the allotted time has passed, the refugee problem would have changed, casting doubt on the validity of whatever planning we might do today.

4. Therefore, in our opinion, it is essential that whatever programs we devise be sufficiently flexible to meet these changing conditions as they occur.

We believe that the present resolution provides a framework which is consistent with these points. I would like, if I may, to summarize what we think the present resolution will do:

1. It will provide for the termination of UNREF insofar as it is a program designed to help specific groups of refugees over a limited period of time for a given sum of money.

2. It will permit fully the continuation of any assistance now provided under the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund so long as the need remains. Examples of this might be the program to settle in-camp refugees and the difficult-cases program.

3. It will permit the continuation of existing programs to meet emergency situations so long as the emergency need remains. A case in point might be the Hungarian refugee program.

4. It will permit the initiation of emergency appeals and programs to meet new emergency refugee situations as they might arise.

5. It will encourage the annual review of the entire effort in order to relate it to current conditions. Programs which have achieved their objectives may be dropped. Programs which are in midstream may be revised and continued. New projects to meet new situations may be added. The balance among all programs may be reassessed to insure that the total represents a realistic approach to the entire refugee situation as changed since the last annual review.

6. It will provide the High Commissioner with a small emergency fund to meet minor emergencies as they arise.

7. It will provide a policy committee which may authorize the High Commissioner's separate appeals for funds and approve specific projects of assistance to refugees.

8. It will provide the High Commissioner with an ever-present mechanism through which he may seek and utilize large-scale emergency aid.

By its separability of programs it will permit countries to concentrate their contributions on those refugee situations of particular appeal and interest to themselves. This should encourage contributions from countries which have not contributed in the past.

Madam Chairman, we believe this resolution recognizes the refugee problem for what it actually is—a dynamic human problem that is the byproduct of political stresses. It is not a static and measurable problem, soluble within a predictable time for some predictable sum of money.

The resolution is necessarily a long one. However, in the light of the explanation I have given I believe the meaning of its individual paragraphs will be clear. Therefore, I do not intend to take the time of the Committee with a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis.

There are, however, three related points which I would like to mention at this time.

Financial Implications

The first is the question of the financial implications which this resolution may hold for the United Nations and for its individual members. On this point I should like to say that in the view of my delegation neither the sponsors nor the supporters of this resolution are assuming any moral or legal obligations toward future financial contributions. I have already stated that it is the intention of my Government to continue to support the constructive programs of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. However, it is well known that all future financial commitments of the United States are within the province of the Congress of the United States to determine on an annual basis. It would not be possible, therefore, for my delegation to make either an actual or an implied promise of such future financial support from the United States. It is my personal belief and hope that financial support by the United States will continue in the future for a soundly conceived program. I believe that the past record of the United States in this field is a powerful indication that our interest in the humanitarian problems of refugees is a continuing one and is deeply rooted in our history and our beliefs. Nonetheless, I repeat that we could not support the present resolution if we felt

that it implied an obligation of future financial support.

Secondly, there may exist a question as to whether the proposal envisaged in this resolution is intended to affect the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. As we all know, the question of Arab refugees in Palestine is being dealt with by other United Nations agencies. It is therefore not the responsibility of the High Commissioner for Refugees. And it is not the intention of the present resolution to affect the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in any way.

The third question is that concerning the universality of this proposal among refugees under the High Commissioner's mandate. We think there is no room for doubt. The language of this resolution makes very clear that the assistance it will enable the High Commissioner for Refugees to provide is intended for any refugees in need who are under his mandate wherever in the world they may be located—whether in Asia, in Europe, in Africa, or in the Americas. There is no priority among the hungry and the needy except that imposed by greater hunger and greater need itself.

Indeed, it is our belief that the program proposed in this resolution will be far more responsive to need wherever it may arise than the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund program ever could be. By definition the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund program was restricted from its inception. It could help only those who were in need when it was drawn up and were therefore included in its compass.

The present resolution, on the contrary, fully recognizes that there may arise anywhere at any time new situations of need which none of us can now foresee but which should not for that reason—and will not under this resolution—be given insufficient consideration in the High Commissioner's program.

In conclusion, Madam Chairman, let me state that my delegation is proud to associate itself with the sponsorship of this resolution. It is the product of much thought by many people and many nations. We think that it will give the High Commissioner a framework within which he can operate effectively. We think it will give him a program firm enough to enable him to plan for the

future but flexible enough to meet changing conditions. We believe it will provide a means which in the future will enable the High Commissioner to be not only the legal protector but also the effective conscience of the United Nations toward needy refugees who are his charge.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

The General Assembly,

Having considered the problem of those refugees within the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees who are the concern of the United Nations Refugee Fund (UNREF),

Noting with approval that the UNREF programme, if it receives the necessary funds, will have reduced by 31 December 1958 the number of non-settled refugees under the programme to the point where most countries of asylum should be able to support these refugees without international assistance,

Recognizing that after 31 December 1958 there will remain a residual need for international aid in certain countries, and particularly among certain groups and categories of these refugees,

Bearing in mind that new refugee situations requiring international assistance have arisen to augment the problem since the establishment of UNREF, and that other such situations may arise in the future wherein international assistance may be appropriate,

Bearing in mind that, under the Statute of his Office, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is charged with the duty of seeking solutions for the problems of refugees through voluntary repatriation, resettlement and integration,

Recalling its resolution 538 B (VI) adopted on 2 February 1952 in which it authorized the High Commissioner to issue an appeal for funds for the purpose of enabling emergency aid to be given to the most needy groups among refugees within his mandate,

Recalling its resolution 832 (IX) of 21 October 1954 in which it authorized the High Commissioner to undertake a programme to be devoted principally to the promotion of permanent solutions for certain refugees coming within his mandate and also to permit emergency assistance to the most needy cases among these refugees, and to appeal for voluntary contributions towards a fund set up for the purpose of this programme and incorporating the fund authorized in resolution 538 B (VI),

Further recalling Economic and Social Council resolution 565 (XIX) of 31 March 1955 in accordance with which the Council reconstituted the High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees as an Executive Committee,

¹ U.N. doc. L. 639/Rev. 1, as amended; adopted by Committee III on Nov. 12 by a vote of 59-0-14 and in plenary session on Nov. 26 by a vote of 63-0-10.

Having considered Economic and Social Council resolution 650 (XXIV) of 24 July 1957,

1. Approves the recommendations contained in Economic and Social Council resolution 650 (XXIV) of 24 July 1957, and accordingly:

(a) *Requests* the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to intensify the UNREF programme to the fullest extent possible in order to achieve permanent solutions for the maximum number of refugees remaining in camps, without losing sight of the need to continue to seek solutions for the problems of refugees outside camps;

(b) *Authorizes* the High Commissioner to appeal to States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies for the purpose of raising the additional funds needed for closing the refugee camps;

2. *Reaffirms* the basic principle laid down in paragraph 1 of the statute of the High Commissioner's Office regarding forms of permanent solution of the problems of refugees, by actions designed to "facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities";

3. *Decides* that the operations under the United Nations Refugee Fund shall not be continued after 31 December 1958 except as provided for in paragraph 4 below;

4. *Requests* the High Commissioner to supervise the orderly completion of projects financed from the United Nations Refugee Fund which were started but not completed before 31 December 1958, and to carry out the liquidation of UNREF in accordance with paragraph 5 (a) below;

5. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to establish, not later than at its twenty-sixth session, an Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme with the terms of reference set forth below. This Committee shall consist of representatives of from twenty to twenty-five States Members of the United Nations or members of any of the specialized agencies, to be elected by the Council on the widest possible geographical basis from those States with a demonstrated interest in and devotion to the solution of the refugee problem, this Committee to take the place of the UNREF Executive Committee and to be entrusted with the following functions:

(a) To give directives to the High Commissioner for the liquidation of the United Nations Refugee Fund;

(b) To advise the High Commissioner, at his request, in the exercise of his functions under the statute of his Office;

(c) To advise the High Commissioner as to whether it is appropriate for international assistance to be provided through his Office in order to help to solve specific refugee problems remaining unsolved after 31 December 1958 or arising after that date;

(d) To authorize the High Commissioner to make appeals for funds to enable him to solve refugee problems referred to in sub-paragraph (c) above;

(e) To approve projects for assistance to refugees coming within the scope of sub-paragraph (c) above;

(f) To give directives to the High Commissioner for the

use of the emergency fund to be established under the terms of paragraph 7 below;

6. *Authorizes* the High Commissioner, under conditions approved by the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, to make appeals for funds needed to provide supplemental temporary care and maintenance to, and participate in the financing of permanent solutions for, refugees coming within his mandate and otherwise not provided for;

7. *Further authorizes* the High Commissioner to establish an emergency fund not to exceed \$500,000, to be utilized under general directives of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme and to maintain this fund from the repayments of the principal and interest of loans made by the United Nations Refugee Fund (UNREF) and from voluntary contributions made for this purpose;

8. *Decides* that appropriate financial rules for the use of all funds received by the High Commissioner under the terms of this resolution shall be established, in consultation with the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme and in accordance with the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Financial Regulations of the United Nations;

9. *Requests* the UNREF Executive Committee to exercise in 1958 such functions incumbent upon the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme in conformity with paragraph 5 above, as it deems necessary with a view to assuring the continuity of international assistance to refugees falling within the scope of paragraph 5 (c) above;

10. *Requests* the High Commissioner to include in his annual report a statement on the measures which he has taken under the terms of the present resolution.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Asian Regional Conference, ILO

The Department of State announced on November 14 (press release 628) the U.S. delegation to the Fourth Asian Regional Conference of the International Labor Organization, which convened at New Delhi on November 13.

U.S. Government Representatives

Leo R. Werts, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of Labor

Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, New Delhi, India

Advisers

David S. Burgess, Labor Attaché, American Embassy, New Delhi, India

Henri Sokolove, Labor Attaché, American Embassy, Kuala Lumpur, Federation of Malaya

U.S. Employer Representative

Cola G. Parker, president, Kimberly-Clark Corporation, Neenah, Wis.

U.S. Employee Representative

Lee W. Minton, president, Glass Blowers Association of the United States and Canada, Philadelphia, Pa.

The ILO is recognized as a specialized agency of the United Nations in accordance with an agreement between the two organizations which became effective December 11, 1946.

The Director General of the ILO has invited 25 nations to participate in this Conference, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R.

This session of the Conference will deal primarily with consideration of the Director General's report, labor and social problems in the small-scale and handicraft industries in Asian countries, conditions of life and work among agriculture workers, and labor-management relations. Special emphasis is to be made on discussions covering this last point.

These conferences are held approximately every 4 years, the last one having been held at Tokyo September 14-25, 1953.

Pacific Science Congress

The Department of State announced on November 18 (press release 635) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation at the Ninth Pacific Science Congress of the Pacific Science Association, which will be held at Bangkok, Thailand, November 18-December 9, 1957, under the auspices of the Government of Thailand and the Science Society of Thailand:

Delegates

Knowles A. Ryerson, *chairman*, dean, College of Agriculture, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.

Robert D. Fletcher, director, Air Weather Service, Scientific Services, Andrews Air Force Base, Camp Springs, Md.

F. R. Fosberg, U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior

William D. Johnston, Jr., U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior

L. A. Maynard, chairman, Division of Biology and Agriculture, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Washington, D.C.

Karl F. Meyer, retired director, G.W. Hooper Foundation, University of California Medical Center, Berkeley, Calif.

George P. Murdock, professor of anthropology, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

Cyril E. Pemberton, retired, Department of Entomology, Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association Experiment Station, Honolulu, T.H.

Roger R. Revelle, director, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.

Athelstan F. Spilhaus, dean, Institute of Technology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.

Alexander Speehr, director, Bernice P. Bishop Museum, Honolulu, T.H.

R. Earl Storie, professor of soils and plant nutrition, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.

The Pacific Science Association was founded by the late Herbert E. Gregory, director of the Bishop Museum in Honolulu, Hawaii, when the First Pan-Pacific Scientific Conference was convened there in 1920. Member countries adhere to the Association through scientific organizations. The United States adheres through the National Research Council.

The Pacific Science Council is the continuing organization of the Association. It presently consists of members of scientific organizations from 14 countries: Australia, Canada, China, France, Hawaii, Indonesia, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, and Viet-Nam.

ECE Steel Committee

The Department of State announced on November 21 (press release 638) the designation of Walter H. Leo of Kansas City, Mo., an executive of the Sheffield Division of Armco Steel Corporation, as U.S. delegate to the 19th session of the Steel Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) to be held at Geneva, Switzerland, beginning November 25, 1957.

The Committee, which is one of the principal subcommittee groups of ECE, provides a forum where experts in the field of steel production may meet periodically to consider and discuss problems of common interest. Discussions in the coming session will concern papers on the long-term trends and problems in the European steel industry, the preparation of the steel market review for 1957, and the methodology of manning tables, and the progress of the work on the report on wire rods and wire. The Committee will also discuss its annual report to ECE.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.

Ratification deposited: El Salvador, November 22, 1957.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Signed at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.

Acceptance deposited: Ireland, November 15, 1957.

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Adherence deposited: Tunisia, November 18, 1957.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Argentina, November 13, 1957.

Customs Tariffs

Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels July 5, 1890 (26 Stat. 1518), creating an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs. Done at Brussels December 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950. TIAS 3922.

Adherence deposited: Hungary, October 18, 1957.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.

Acceptance deposited: Greece, September 26, 1957.

Signature and acceptance: Afghanistan, September 23, 1957.

Fur Seals

Interim convention on conservation of north Pacific fur seals. Signed at Washington February 9, 1957. Entered into force October 14, 1957.

Proclaimed by the President: November 15, 1957.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

International convention for the northwest Atlantic fisheries. Dated at Washington February 8, 1949. Entered into force July 3, 1950. TIAS 2089.

Notification by Federal Republic of Germany of application to: Land Berlin, August 26, 1957.

Protocol to the international convention for the northwest Atlantic fisheries signed at Washington under

¹ Not in force.

date of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington June 25, 1956.¹

Notification by Federal Republic of Germany of application to: Land Berlin, August 26, 1957.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention and six annexes. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.

Accession deposited: Sudan, October 23, 1957.

Weather Stations

Agreement on north Atlantic ocean stations. Done at Paris February 25, 1954. Entered into force February 1, 1955. TIAS 3186.

Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, October 15, 1957.

Whaling

Amendments to paragraphs 5, 8(a) and (c), and 11 of the schedule of the international whaling convention of 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at the ninth meeting of the International Whaling Commission, London June 24-28, 1957. Entered into force October 4, 1957.

BILATERAL

Israel

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721; 71 Stat. 345), with agreed minute and memorandum of understanding. Signed at Washington November 7, 1957. Entered into force November 7, 1957.

Korea

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, with protocol. Signed at Seoul November 28, 1956. Entered into force November 7, 1957.

Proclaimed by the President: November 15, 1957.

Supplementary commercial convention. Signed at Washington August 26, 1852. Entered into force April 8, 1853. 10 Stat. 982.

Terminated: December 5, 1957 (replaced by treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, *supra*).

Agreement relating to registration of trade-marks. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Washington February 10 and 16, 1883. Entered into force February 16, 1883. II Malloy 1265.

Terminated: December 5, 1957 (replaced by treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, *supra*).

Norway

Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2016). Effectuated by exchange of notes at Oslo October 24 and November 4, 1957. Entered into force November 4, 1957.

Portugal

Agreement supplementing the defense agreement of September 6, 1951 (TIAS 3087). Signed at Lisbon November 15, 1957. Entered into force November 15, 1957.

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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to November 18 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 626 of November 13, 628 of November 14, 630 of November 15, and 633 of November 16.

No.	Date	Subject
*634	11/18	Death of Mr. and Mrs. Philip Sullivan.
635	11/18	Delegation to Pacific Science Congress (rewrite).
636	11/19	Dulles: news conference.
†637	11/20	Elbrick: "Problems and Progress in the Atlantic Community."
638	11/21	Delegate to ECE Steel Committee (rewrite).
†639	11/22	Program for visit of King Mohamed V (rewrite).
640	11/22	Liberia, Peru, and Ecuador waive fingerprint requirements.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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